The problem of evil remains one of the most powerful philosophical objections to the existence of God, particularly concerning divine omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness. In his 2019 work Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba has formulated a contemporary version of this problem by integrating principles from moral philosophy, especially the doctrine of Double Effect and the Pauline principle, into the debate. He argues that God, by failing to prevent horrendous moral evils, violates even the minimal standards of moral responsibility and thereby contradicts the notion of perfect goodness. This article offers a critical response to Sterba’s argument by addressing two interrelated issues. Firstly, following Gilbert Ryle’s definition, it will be argued that Sterba commits a “category mistake” by evaluating God’s actions according to standards appropriate to human moral agency, as this approach overlooks the ontological and epistemological distinctions between God and humans. Secondly, it will be argued that the action theory developed by the prominent Mu‘tazilite theologian, Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, provides a far more coherent and robust framework for evaluating divine actions. Qāḍī’s theory encompasses divine attributes such as omnipotence, knowledge, and will, emphasizing that these attributes operate within the framework of justice (ʿadl) and wisdom (ḥikma), principles frequently invoked in the Islamic intellectual tradition, thus avoiding an account of divine will as arbitrary. Moreover, Qāḍī’s acknowledgment that human-related factors such as benefit (maṣlaḥa), grace (iḥsān), and need are taken into account in God’s actions reinforces the thesis of the purposiveness of divine acts. Unlike the skeptical theism that renders God’s reasons unknowable, Qāḍī asserts that divine actions are both just and comprehensible. In order to support the hypothesis developed on the basis of Qāḍī’s views, this study also draws on contemporary critiques of Sterba’s argument from evil. These critiques provide a substantive foundation that further reinforces Qāḍī’s perspective. Ultimately, the article contends that classical Islamic theology, particularly Qāḍī’s action theory, offers a philosophically robust and morally meaningful alternative to Sterba’s challenge.