Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Part of book or chapter of book , Preprint 01 Jan 2010 Italy English Publisher:Graduate School of Management St, Petersburg University

Authors: ATTANASI, GIUSEPPE; A. Garcia Gallego; N. Georgantzis; MONTESANO, ALDO MARIA;

handle: 11573/1622291 , 11565/3737061

Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals

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Abstract

We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto-efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

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Italy

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Keywords

Bargaining; Confirmed proposals; Confirmed agreement, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:C78

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