In this paper Dennett’s compatibilism is briefly put forward to be discussed afterwards. His proposal consists of an acceptance of determinism, but at the same time a denial of certain characteristics that are usually associated to it, such as inevitability or the idea that it limits our possibilities, and defending that it is compatible with the fact that some events do not have any cause. My discussion tries to show that his concept of inevitability is misleading, that he understands the condition “I could have done otherwise” mistakenly and that his concept of determinism as sufficiency and his idea that subdermination implies that there is not a cause are strange to an habitual way of thinking.

En este trabajo se expone brevemente el compatibilismo de Dennett, para después discutirlo. Su propuesta consiste en aceptar el determinismo, pero al mismo tiempo negar ciertos rasgos que se suelen asociar a él, como la inevitabilidad o la idea de que limita nuestras posibilidades, y sostener que es compatible con que algunos eventos no tengan ninguna causa. Mi discusión trata de mostrar que su concepto de inevitabilidad es engañoso, que entiende de modo erróneo la condición “podría haber obrado de otro modo” y que su concepción del determinismo como suficiencia y su idea de que la subdeterminación implica que no hay una causa son extrañas a la forma habitual de pensar.