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Digitalni Knihovna - Knihovna Akademie věd ČR
Article . 2012
Full-Text: http://dlib.lib.cas.cz/7466/1/2012_03_199.pdf
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IRIS Catalogo dei prodotti della ricerca scientifica LUISS
Article . 2012
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Research Papers in Economics
Article . 2012
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Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Jan 2012 Italy Publisher:Charles UniversityJournal:Czech Economic Review, volume 6, pages 199-208
Authors: Briata, Federica; DALL'AGLIO, MARCO; Fragnelli, Vito;

handle: 11385/50656 , 11579/33292

Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure

Abstract

In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.

Country
Italy
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Keywords

Fairness, Knaster’s procedure, complete risk aversion, dynamic coalition formation, HB Economic Theory, Fairness; Knaster’s procedure; complete risk aversion; dynamic coalition formation, HG Finance, 330, HF Commerce, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:C71

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selected citations
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This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
BIP!Citations provided by BIP!
popularity
This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.
BIP!Popularity provided by BIP!
influence
This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
BIP!Influence provided by BIP!
impulse
This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.
BIP!Impulse provided by BIP!
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