This paper critically examines the decision of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) in collective complaint no. 208/2022 concerning the right to strike in Italy, particularly within essential public services. While the ECSR correctly identifies the excessive breadth and indeterminacy of the notion of “essential services” under Law no. 146/1990 as a violation of Article 6§4 of the European Social Charter, the paper argues that it underestimates the structural deficiencies of judicial protection. Drawing on Italy’s constitutional history, the analysis shows how a strongly protected right has been progressively “neutralised” through processes of administrativisation, whereby an independent administrative agency and the executive authorities exercise expansive discretionary powers. Weak judicial oversight, restrictive standing rules, and deferential review standards effectively limit access to remedies, undermining constitutional guarantees. The Italian case thus illustrates a broader constitutional problem: rights protection depends not only on formal recognition but also on the institutional and procedural infrastructures that render rights justiciable and effective.