
handle: 11336/258694
The set of all strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences over a finite and linearly ordered set of alternatives coincides with the class of all generalized median voter schemes. Our objective in this paper is to characterize the subclass of generalized median voter schemes that, in addition of being strategy-proof, are also obviously strategy-proof. Our proof is constructive: for each obviously strategy-proof generalized median voter scheme we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Masso, Jordi. Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona. Departamento de Economía y Historia Económica; España
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
VII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Argentina
MAJORITY VOTING, MEDIAN VOTERS, OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOFNESS, https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1, https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
MAJORITY VOTING, MEDIAN VOTERS, OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOFNESS, https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1, https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
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