An increasing number of international organizations are engaged in the monitoring of elections in unconsolidated regimes, yet the causes and consequences of multilateral observation missions remain largely unexplored. Our theoretical arguments focus on incumbents who extend invitations strategically to a mix of lenient and critical observer missions. Arguably, inviting a mix of observers can lead to disagreements between monitors and increase the chance of a favorable assessment even if elections are fraudulent. Advancing a two-step argument on the selection of multiple observer assignments and their impact on post-election unrest, we propose that leaders who fear a negative assessment by an observer and who are under international pressure are more likely to invite a combination of low and high-quality monitors. Although the invitation or acceptance of a low-quality monitor weakens the credibility of an incumbent, it increases the chance of a dissenting opinion. This boosts, in return, the probability that a cheating incumbent can avoid post-election unrest. The empirical analysis demonstrates that asking for additional observer reports by lenient organizations frequently pays off, showing that the presence of a mix of observer organizations helps avoid the costly consequences cheating incumbents would face otherwise.

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