The debate about the direct election of the Czech president within the fields of political science and constitutional law has been almost unanimously sceptical about the introduction of the popular vote. This article offers a contrary perspective developed through theorising a potential tribune function of the Czech presidents. We investigate the workings of the original office of the Roman tribunate, the place of tribune function as a democratic element within the classical accounts of the mixed constitution, and its revival in modern political theory and political sociology. We argue that the popular vote increased the tribune potential of the Czech presidency to channel Czech democracy’s discontent. If some major deficiencies of the direct vote are reformed, such as the polarising two-round electoral system, the president-tribune could constitute a popularly established check on MPs, the government, and other elites. In such a case, the introduction of the direct election could be viewed not as a systemic flaw but as an integrative feature strengthening the system of checks and balances.