This article tries to develop a theoretical framework for judicial policy of apex courts. First, judicial policy is distinguished from politics and understood as court’s law-making (apex courts as positive legislators) directed by strategic reasons, not only by purely legal reasons. Thus, various techniques apex courts might use to make law (e.g. technique of time bombs, technique of creating new doctrines, arguments or principles on the one hand and exceptions to them on the other at the same time etc.) are demonstrated. These techniques, typical for legal discourse, can be combined with other techniques suitable for apex courts because of the institutional design (like e.g. technique of conform interpretation). All these techniques can be successful, if their results are in the long run accepted by other players, especially by other apex courts and by legislator itself. Thus, especially towards legislator apex courts have developed another set of techniques used to minimize conflicts with legislator, but at the same time to keep the position of positive legislator for themselves. The second part of the article is about proper timing of these techniques to ensure that courts’ innovations are accepted in the long run. To conclude, the use of all these techniques resembles strongly the use of virtue of prudentia as it was developed in the scholastic philosophy – in the similar way like prudentia (e.g. for Aquinas) cannot bring the same level of certainty in the sphere of practical reason (in comparison with the sphere of theoretical reason), the use of these techniques of judicial policy cannot in itself ensure the success of judicial policy. The use of all techniques is demonstrated using examples from case law of constitutional courts (typically German, Italian, Spanish, French or Czech), supreme courts (Dutch), supreme administrative tribunals (French Council of State) and Court of Justice of the EU to support the general character of the presented theoretical framework.