This thesis analyzes the performance of German and U.S.-led PRTs currently deployed in Afghanistan. The major conclusion of this thesis is that the PRTs are limited in their capabilities to significantly reconstruct or bring stability to Afghanistan. Despite their initial success between 2003 and 2005, they are currently unable to address the challenges in Afghanistan. Utilizing systematic case studies this thesis examines the structure, strategy, and experiences of German and U.S.-led PRTs. The assessment focuses on four different performance criteria: capacity building, stability, relationshipbuilding, and aid projects and coordination. Research is based on reports of international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, as well as on various NGO reports. It is found that the PRTs limitations are not only a consequence of their structural limitations, but also are a result of Afghanistan's dynamic environment, with all its facets and requirements. The main external factors influencing PRTs are Islam, tribal structures, poor governance and a sobering economic situation. This thesis contributes to an advanced understanding of how PRTs function, as well as updating available information on PRTs and Afghanistan.

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http://archive.org/details/scrutinizingndss109454117

German Army author.