Replication is a critical step in the scientific process. This paper is an effort to contribute to the growing literature on the replication of Agent-Based Computational Models. We present a replication of Kollman, Miller & Pages (1997) model of Tiebout sorting. In that model, individual agents with heterogeneous preferences for government policies select among jurisdictions that offer the most satisfactory package of government services. This project makes four contributions to the literature. First, our successful replication provides the research community with a modernized version of that seminal model. Second, we confirm that earlier results with respect to the single jurisdiction setting are highly robust with respect to voter preferences, while the results for multiple jurisdiction settings are sensitive. Third, we find little evidence to suggest that any of the alternative voting rules we consider achieve greter voter satisfaaction or improve the competitiveness of local elections. Finally, we demonstrate a technique for conducting sensitivty analyses that leverages a hig-dimensional experimental design.

Additional electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1555213

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