According to joint doctrine, winning the nation's wars is the primary purpose of the armed forces. It is the foundation of joint professional military education and training, forming the basis for how the warfighter will prosecute a war, and is a reflection of the judgments of senior military leadership. The joint and Service warfighting doctrine of the 1940s and 1950s contained two aspects of war that are not reflected in current joint doctrine. Combat now spans both war and "not war" in the new "military operation other than war", and the process of the military government has been completely replaced by the new "civil administration". This two-part redefinition of war has created a new joint doctrine that is confusing, overlapping, compartmentalized, and incomprehensible, which has in part resulted in the many military failures in the decades since World War II. In general, the second tenet of the Just War Theory dictates that the weak must be protected throughout the war effort. International law of occupation states that certain functions and institutions of the defeated nation must be restored by the occupying power. The military government, such as those found in past wars administered by the U.S. armed forces, is the vehicle to insure the war is prosecuted justly and done so in a manner that will also win the peace. This thesis recommends a return to a holistic continuum of war in two phases - formal hostilities and the post-formal transition to peace - that adheres to international law, incorporates all combat as "formal hostilities", is independent of size or scope, and that requires the armed forces to win the peace as they have successfully done in the past.

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http://archive.org/details/thejustwarorjust109452092