This thesis is concerned with the meta-ethical debate between reasons internalism and externalism, and more specifically with an apparent conflict between reasons internalism and the practice of moral blame. Broadly understood, reasons internalism means that a person has a normative reason to perform an action if and only if she wants to perform it, or would want to under certain conditions. Yet, when a person is blamed, it seems to involve a claim that she had most reason to do other than she did – irrespective of what she wanted. I argue that, as the problem is presented above, blame provides objections against reasons internalism. I then investigate the possibility that blameworthiness is not contingent upon reasons in the way the problem supposes. I cannot find grounds for an account of blameworthiness that both fulfils the conditions that are required under internalism to avoid the problem and yet still entails that all the characters who should be are suitably blameworthy. The blame problem persists.