The objective of this dissertation is to examine the moral arguments commonly presented in the current debate on active and passive euthanasia in the United States. I claim the belief that there is a moral permissibility difference between active and passive euthanasia, which is that active euthanasia is impermissible and passive euthanasia is permissible, is unable to be supported by the arguments given in its defense. I first clarify what types of medical conditions commonly associated with euthanasia debates I will be considering as well as different types of euthanasia, and why there is no clear guidance in the medical field. I then present the three strongest arguments in defense of the moral permissibility difference. They are an application of the Doctrine of Double Effect, an appeal to the distinction between killing and letting die, and an appeal to patient rights. I present counterarguments to each, concluding that the original arguments fail in defending the moral permissibility distinction.