
handle: 10495/7901
ABSTRACT: The present article analyzes the agency problem between minority and majority shareholders of Colombian Simplified Stock Corporation (S.A.S.). For this, the paper proposes a model of game theory to compare the incentives of minority and majority shareholders in the S.A.S. and the Colombian Code of Commerce. Finally presents a solution of agency problem through the institution of abuse of right and measurements of corporate governance.
340, Agency Problem, 330, Game Theory, Colombian Simplified Stock Corporation, Minority and Majority Shareholder
340, Agency Problem, 330, Game Theory, Colombian Simplified Stock Corporation, Minority and Majority Shareholder
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