This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part (paragraphs 1-8), I introduce the general problem of “naturalization”. I outline the context in which the discussion is situated - the tumultuous development of the cognitive sciences in the middle of the last century and the associated wave of diffusion of philosophical naturalism - and I draw, in broad strokes, the model of naturalization that seems to me to be the most robust. The discourse will initially be developed in general terms, since the problem of naturalization is far-reaching and affects the whole map of relations between philosophy on the one hand, and empirical sciences on the other hand - and in particular the empirical sciences of the mind, especially psychology and cognitive neurosciences. To conclude, I focus on the naturalization of normativity. In the second part (paragraphs 9-14), I wonder whether the program of naturalization, in the variant described, can be considered “reductionist,” and whether, if so, this is a bad or a good thing.