
handle: 10419/72579
The efficiency of the Pigouvian tax suggests that price-based regulation is the proper benchmark for efficient regulation. However, results due to Carlton and Loury (1980, 1986) question this; when harm depends on scale effects a pure Pigou tax is inefficient regulation in the long run. In this note we make precise that there is an efficient tax scheme for controlling harm as long as social optimum exists. In particular, the efficient tax scheme is based on a tax rate equal to marginal harm. Hence, price regulation is the right benchmark for regulation even in the presence of scale effects in the harm function.
externalities,scale effects,Pigou-taxes, ddc:330, scale effects, externalities, Social Sciences, H, D61, Economics as a science, D62, Pigou-taxes, HB71-74, jel: jel:D62, jel: jel:D61
externalities,scale effects,Pigou-taxes, ddc:330, scale effects, externalities, Social Sciences, H, D61, Economics as a science, D62, Pigou-taxes, HB71-74, jel: jel:D62, jel: jel:D61
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 0 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
