
handle: 10419/68135
We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist\ud equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed\ud to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the\ud conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The\ud emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences,\ud the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology\ud of agent interaction.
Social norms, Spieltheorie, ddc:330, best reply, HB, C7, Soziale Norm, Lernprozess, D11, conformity
Social norms, Spieltheorie, ddc:330, best reply, HB, C7, Soziale Norm, Lernprozess, D11, conformity
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