
handle: 10419/43788
Game Theory describes human interaction involving conflict, cooperation and competition, the term Interpersonal Decision Theory is synonymous. The term reflects the fact that most essential features of this field are manifested in parlor games. This topic-level treatment covers large parts of the basic concepts and methods and sketches some fields of recent applications. The simultaneous occurrence of strategic, stochastic and dynamic phenomena, the fundamental role of epistemic aspects like knowledge and information and the impact of institutional and organizational structures make game theoretic analysis a highly complex task.
knowledge, 330, characters, payoff function, balanced games, TU-game, mechanism, modiclus, homogeneous games, Nash equilibrium, Aumann economy, Nash solution, apportionment, evolutionary stability, vNM-Stable Set, LP-game, Maschler-Perles solution, normal form, allocation, cost sharing, Walrasian equilibrium, directed games, Shapley value, cooperative game, revelation principle, nucleolus, implementation, exchange economy, fictitious play, voting games, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, ddc:330, axiomatic approach, bargaining solution, core, game form, outcome function, coalitional form, coordination game, convex games, repeated games, social choice rule, equivalence principle, reduced games, extensive form, simple games, incentive compatible
knowledge, 330, characters, payoff function, balanced games, TU-game, mechanism, modiclus, homogeneous games, Nash equilibrium, Aumann economy, Nash solution, apportionment, evolutionary stability, vNM-Stable Set, LP-game, Maschler-Perles solution, normal form, allocation, cost sharing, Walrasian equilibrium, directed games, Shapley value, cooperative game, revelation principle, nucleolus, implementation, exchange economy, fictitious play, voting games, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, ddc:330, axiomatic approach, bargaining solution, core, game form, outcome function, coalitional form, coordination game, convex games, repeated games, social choice rule, equivalence principle, reduced games, extensive form, simple games, incentive compatible
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