Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Research , Preprint 01 Jan 2006 English Publisher:Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management ScienceFunded by:NSF | Continued Studies of Endo..., NSF | Endogenous Mechanisims, NSF | Topics in the theory of o...

Authors: Eddie Dekel; Matthew O. Jackson; Asher Wolinksy;

handle: 10419/31252 , 10419/31254

Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying

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Abstract

We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.

Related Organizations

Northwestern University
United States
California Institute of Technology
United States

Keywords

Spieltheorie, ddc:330, P16, lobbying, Wahl, political economy, C72, vote buying, Wahlverhalten, Politische Partei, vote buying, lobbying, legislatures, political economy., Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie, campaign promises, Theorie, legislatures, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:P16

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