
handle: 10419/150155 , 1807/27184
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge.
Agreeing theorem, D82, ddc:330, C70, common knowledge, Agreeing theorem, common knowledge, common prior, no trade theorem, agreement theorems, common knowledge, common prior, no trade theorem, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:C7, jel: jel:D8
Agreeing theorem, D82, ddc:330, C70, common knowledge, Agreeing theorem, common knowledge, common prior, no trade theorem, agreement theorems, common knowledge, common prior, no trade theorem, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:C7, jel: jel:D8
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