Strategic power indices: quarrelling in coalitions
Strategic power indices: quarrelling in coalitions
While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the in-dices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.
- Maastricht University Netherlands
Banzhaf index, Shapley-Wert, Abstimmungsspiel, Spieltheorie, ddc:330, Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index, a priori voting power, rational players, rational players, C71, D72, a priori voting power, Shapley-Shubik index, Theorie, jel: jel:C71, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D72
Banzhaf index, Shapley-Wert, Abstimmungsspiel, Spieltheorie, ddc:330, Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index, a priori voting power, rational players, rational players, C71, D72, a priori voting power, Shapley-Shubik index, Theorie, jel: jel:C71, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D72
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