
This paper analyzes the optimality of credit risk transfer (CRT) in banking. In a model where banks' main activity is to monitor loans, we show that a combination of CRT instruments, loan sales and credit derivatives, might be optimal to insure banks against shocks and to optimally redeploy capital when new investment opportunities arise, without impairing incentives. We derive implications for the optimal design of capital requirements.
credit risk transfer; solvency regulation; monitoring
credit risk transfer; solvency regulation; monitoring
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