We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, in the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision, other than incentive problems, the distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role.

The first author acknowledges financial support from STICERD, and the second author acknowledges financial support by the Juan de la Cierva Programme.

Trabajo presentado al "Economics of NGOs and Non-Profits" celebrado en Francia en 2010.

Peer reviewed