In a one-shot two-person lab experiment we study how behavior is affected by whether player 1 reads the message that player 2 has sent him/her. The issue of one’s communication being considered is relevant in organizations, bargaining and in public decision-making. Our work is motivated by our general interest in how free-form communication affects economic behavior. We have data from three treatments: Optional Communication (N=220), Fixed Communication (N=110) and No Communication (N=110), with the two latter treatments acting as controls. The experiment has two stages. In stage 1 of Optional Communication, player 1 has to choose between two payoff distributions affecting both players 1 and 2. Before player 1 makes the decision, player 2 can send a free-form message to player 1. Before player 1 makes the decision he can choose to read the message or not. In stage 2, player 2 can reward or punish player 1. We study behavior in two different tasks, which differ in the two payoff distributions that are possible. In task 1 (task 2) player 1 has to choose between the following payoff distributions: A ($24, $6) and B ($18, $12) (A ($24, $6) B ($4, $26)). In task 1 player’s 1 decision can be easily influenced by player 2’s message, whereas in task 2 it seems less likely that player 1 can be influenced. The experiments were run at the MONLEE lab at Monash using z-tree. The results show that player 2’s behavior is consistent with reacting differently to kind and unkind treatment and not by whether he/she is listened to or not. Player 1’s behavior is consistent with curiosity or respect and not with the exploitation of moral wiggle room or self-image concerns. We relate our results to several models of social preferences.

Resumen del trabajo presentado en el 6th International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences (IMEBESS), celebrado en Utrech (Países Bajos), del 2 al 4 de mayo de 2019