A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Research , Other ORP type , Preprint 01 Apr 2002 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Journal of Economic Theory, volume 103, pages 461-474 (issn: 0022-0531,

Copyright policy )

Authors: David Pérez-Castrillo; Marilda Sotomayor;

doi: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2783

handle: 10261/1938

A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

- Summary
- Subjects
- Metrics

Abstract

For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies. That is, the mechanism leads to the maximum equilibrium prices and to an optimal matching.

Pérez-Castrillo acknowledges the financial support from projects DGES PB 92-0590, DGES PB 96-1192, and SGR 98-62. Sotomayor acknowledges J.S. Guggenheim Foundation, FAPESP, and FIPE - Sao Paulo - Brazil.

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0704.

Peer reviewed

Related Organizations

View all View all

Keywords

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, Matching models, Implementation, Mechanisms, mechanism, Matching model, Assignment model, implementation, assignment model, matching model

Impact byBIP!

	selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	19
	popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.	Average
	influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	Top 10%
	impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.	Average