Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Research , Other literature type , Preprint 01 Jan 2012 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

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Authors: Paula Jaramillo; Çagatay Kayi; Flip Klijn;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2104277 , 10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8 , 10.57784/1992/8300 , 10.48713/10336_10842

handle: 10261/125581

Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

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Abstract

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Related Organizations

Autonomous University of Barcelona
Spain
Universidad del Rosario
Colombia
Universidad de Los Andes
Colombia
Universidad de San Buenaventura, Bogota
Colombia
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
Spain

Keywords

fairness, strategy-proofness, indivisible good, land restitution, fairness, indivisible good, Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.), strategy-proofness, land restitution, jel: jel:D63, jel: jel:D61

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