While Marxism espouses Hegel's acceptance of contradictory truths, it is unclear whether and how that acceptance tallies with the assertion that all contradictions ought to be overcome or sublated, hence that no contradiction can have but a transient validity. Does that mean that contradictions are only prima facie true, yet all-things-considered false? Or else how can they change their truth-value? Hegel solves the problem by identifying the order of thought with the order of being within his absolute idealism. Such an approach could be formalized through a dynamic logic. However, dialectical materialism is debarred from falling back on such an identification. In my 1965 unpublished paper on dialectical contradictions according to Marxist theory of knowledge I unsuccessfully tried to apply the Hegelian account to dialectical materialism. Ten years later I embarked on a different voyage, namely reducing true contradictions to partial truths by dint of a paraconsistent many-valued logic of fuzziness.

Este fragmento de un opúsculo inédito de 1965 constituye el primer intento del autor para abordar el problema de la verdad contradictoria en la lógica dialéctica según un lineamiento hegeliano, susceptible de articularse con una lógica dinámica; el prefacio de 2015 señala las dificultades de esa vía y explica el viraje de 1975/76 que llevó a buscar otra, la de los grados de verdad con una lógica multivalente y paraconsistente.

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