Modelling enforcement and compliance in fisheries: A survey

Monitoring and enforcement considerations have been largely ignored in the study of fishery management. This paper discusses this issue with a formal model to show the impacts of costly, imperfect enforcement of law on the behaviour of fishing firms and fisheries management. Theoretical analysis combines a standard bio-economic model of fisheries (Gordon/Schaefer) with Becker’s theory of Crime and Punishment.

peer-reviewed

Countries

Portugal, Malta

Related Organizations

Iscte - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa
Portugal
University of Malta
Malta

Keywords

Crime -- Crime, Punishment, Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Naturais::Matemáticas, Crime -- Case studies, Fisheries, Law enforcement -- Case studies, Crime, Política comum da pesca -- Common fisheries policy, Enforcement, Becker’s theory

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