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Recolector de Ciencia Abierta, RECOLECTA
Research . 1992
Data sources: Recolector de Ciencia Abierta, RECOLECTA
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Recolector de Ciencia Abierta, RECOLECTA
Research . 2009
Data sources: Recolector de Ciencia Abierta, RECOLECTA
Research Papers in Economics
Preprint . 1992
Full-Text: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18461/1/MPRA_paper_18461.pdf
Data sources: Research Papers in Economics
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On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Research , Preprint , Report 01 Jan 1992 Germany Publisher:IVIE
Authors: Corchon, Luis; Ritzberger, Klaus;

handle: 10016/4330

On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining

Abstract

In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To seLect the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the anaLyst.

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Germany
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Keywords

C78 - Bargaining Theory, C72 - Noncooperative Games, Subgame Perfection Rubinstein Game, Matching Theory, C71 - Cooperative Games, Economía, jel: jel:C71, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:C78

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selected citations
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This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
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popularity
This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.
BIP!Popularity provided by BIP!
influence
This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
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impulse
This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.
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