This thesis consists of three chapters, each of which is self-contained and studies a distinct theoretical setting. All chapters are linked by a common focus on strategic communication, where private information is communicated strategically. CHAPTER 1: OPTIMAL BONUS STRUCTURE UNDER STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION Bonus structures are a common tool used by organizations to incentivize workers’ efforts. Halac, Lipnowski, and Rappoport (2021) assumes workers cannot observe each other’s contracts and derives the optimal bonus structure that uniquely implements work. In reality, however, workers can strategically communicate with each other before exerting effort. I study the optimal bonus structure that uniquely implements work when communication is allowed. I model the interaction as a two-stage game: a communication stage where workers communicate with each other, and an action stage where workers choose whether to work. I show that the optimal bonus structure is robust to communication that takes the form of Bayesian persuasion and cheap talk, in the sense that the unique equilibrium involves workers sharing no information in the communication stage and always working in the action stage. CHAPTER 2: EVALUATING EXPERTS UNDER IMAGE CONCERNS An expert with image concern wishes to persuade others that he holds a certain opinion, which could result in the expert failing to report his opinion truthfully. Can we learn about the expert’s true opinion under such image concern by evaluating him appropriately? I characterize robust evaluation rules that implement truth-telling equilibrium under any level of image concern. I further derive robust evaluation rules that minimize the cost of incentivizing truth telling and show that such evaluation rules always provide a higher material payoff to a dissenting report. CHAPTER 3: THE MARKET FOR EXPERT ENDORSEMENT When experts are hired as tools of persuasion, how are their incentives to reveal information affected? This paper studies a three-party model (expert, manager, public) where an expert, either informed or uninformed, is hired by a manager to persuade the public about an uncertain state. The expert wish to be perceived as informed. In a baseline setting, I show that the reputation concern lead to the expert providing endorsement inconsistent with his private beliefs. In the second and third settings. I show that information control power is only beneficial to the manager when combined with commitment power, in which case, the uninformed expert becomes more valuable than the informed expert to the manager in terms of increasing the probability of successful persuasion.