
handle: 10419/159085
We show that any social choice function that always selects envy-free Pareto efficient allocations must violate Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
SECS-P/01 Economia politica, Quaderni - Working Paper DSE, ddc:330
SECS-P/01 Economia politica, Quaderni - Working Paper DSE, ddc:330
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