There are two possible ways to approach the problem of kitsch; we may either attempt to describe what kitsch-objects are, or focus attention on the human attitude which enables us to judge something as kitsch. We are, therefore, confronted with two different tasks; the first one consists in investigating into properties of aesthetically deviant objects in order to delimit the kitsch-sphere within the domain of aesthetics; the second one is an analysis of an interpretation of, or an attitude towards, objects, no matter what their aesthetic value is, which turns them into kitsch. The two approaches may be conveniently labelled as the kitsch-object approach and the kitsch-interpretation approach. In this connection a following remark suggests itself. It seems natural to regard kitsch as an aesthetic failure; it is often contrasted with good or genuine art and it is defined in terms of bad taste, artistic dillentantism, lack of originality, and the like. However, kitsch cannot be simply identified with mediocre art or trash; there is a lot of trash which can be hardly regarded as kitsch. In order to account for what is peculiar about kitsch it is necessary to go beyond a characteristic in terms of aesthetics.