The Indo-Pacific strategy marks a shift in U.S. policy toward China from engagement to containment. The new goal of above policy is to comprehensively use various means to prevent China’s further rise and continue to maintain U.S. comparative advantage. However, the U.S. has been in trouble in recent years in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, unable to focus on China’s rise. Therefore, uniting Japan, India, and Australia to share the responsibility and obligation to balance China among the so-called G4 will not only meet the strategic needs of dealing with China’s threat, but also reduce the pressure of U.S. global strategic contraction. For Japan, India and Australia, in the face of an increasingly aggressive China, all three countries feel the need to seek the support and help of the United States, a major power outside the region, to maintain regional balance of power and balance. From the theoretical perspective of offensive realism, the Indo-Pacific strategy embodies the policy preferences of the four countries for establishing a balance of power and shirking responsibility in the process of maintaining the balance of regional power structures. However, like the theoretical flaws of offensive realism, the Indo-Pacific strategy has limitations and potential risks that may have a negative impact on the effective development of the strategy.