This dissertation is guided by three questions: (1) what is moral agency, (2) are AI systems moral agents, and (3) why should we care? Part I, Towards a Theory of Moral Agency, develops a theoretical account of moral agency. In Chapter 2, “Moral Agency Without Consciousness,” I argue that phenomenal consciousness is not necessary for moral agency. In Chapter 3, “Two Types of Moral Agency,” I argue that there is a substantive distinction between entities that are appropriate subjects of deontic evaluations and entities that are appropriate subjects of responsibility ascriptions. Part II, Prospects of Artificial Moral Agency, evaluates the extent to which AI systems are moral agents. In Chapter 4, “Artificial ‘Agents’ are Not Agents,” I argue that existing AI systems lack the capacity for intentional action because they lack mental states. In Chapter 5, “Artificial ‘Agents’ are Not Moral,” I argue that AI systems exhibit only a minimal level of the moral competence required for moral agency. Part III, Using Artificial (non) Moral Agents, considers how the moral agency of AI systems, or lack thereof, bears on how we should use those systems in moral decision-making. In Chapter 6, “Artificial Moral Behavior,” I argue that delegating moral decisions to AI systems is wrong because doing so turns events that should be moral actions into mere behaviors. In Chapter 7, “Moral Agents Unlike Us,” I argue that moral agency is not all that matters—artificial non-conscious moral agents will be different from human moral agents in normatively significant ways.