
doi: 10.52195/pm.v3i2.341
handle: 11441/75251
This paper first presents the principal works of the 2005 Eco-nomic Nobel Prize Thomas C. Shelling and Robert J. Aumann. Then we answer the economic question, is cooperative behavior rational? We guess estrat-ethic games as a solution to prisioner´s dilemma. We also argue that Economics and Ethics are integrated or should be. Key words: Game theory, rationality, Homo Economicus, corporate capi-tal, economic ethics, assets, intangible assets. Clasificación JEL: C79, A13, Z12, Z13. Resumen: En este trabajo, tras esbozar las principales aportaciones de los premios Nobel de Economía de 2005 Thomas C. Shelling y Robert J. Aumann, respondemos a un dilema social con un importante calado eco-nómico: ¿es racional el comportamiento cooperativo? Para ello propo-nemos los juegos estrat-éticos como una posible solución a dilemas socia-les tipo «dilema del prisionero». También argumentamos que la Economía y la Ética están integradas o deberían estarlo. Palabras clave: Teoría de Juegos, racionalidad, Homo Economicus, capi-tal social, Ética Económica, activos intangibles.
Assets, Teoría de Juegos, Capital social, Racionalidad, Economic ethics, Homo Economicus, Rationality, Ética Económica, Intangible assets, Activos intangibles, Game theory, Corporate capital
Assets, Teoría de Juegos, Capital social, Racionalidad, Economic ethics, Homo Economicus, Rationality, Ética Económica, Intangible assets, Activos intangibles, Game theory, Corporate capital
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 0 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
