Bernard Matolino’s critique of both the radical and moderate communitarian conception of personhood in African philosophy has itself been widely criticized by scholars such as Anthony Oritsegbugbemi Oyowe, Kai Horsthemke, and Mesembe Edet, just to mention a few. One of their major criticisms is that Matolino’s alternative theory of personhood, known as limited communitarianism, is not different from Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism in any significant sense. He has also been criticized for committing the same error for which he rejects the views of Gyekye. We expose some of the weaknesses of these criticisms by showing some remarkable ways in which limited communitarianism differs from moderate communitarianism. We then demonstrate some of the practical relevance of limited communitarianism for moral decision-making, resolution of social problems, and personal and social development.