
doi: 10.3982/te2870
handle: 10810/19435 , 10419/197167
We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be distributed among their members according to their aspirations and to a rationing rule prevailing in society. The outcome of such a process is a hedonic game. Using monotonicity and consistency we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce core-stable hedonic games.
acknowledge nancial support from the Spanish Government ECO2015-67519-P and from the Basque Government IT568-13
Documento de trabajo
Coalition formation, problems, rationing rules, ddc:330, hedonic games, core, satbility, Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.), C71, MICROECONOMICS, core stability, MATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS, Cooperative games, coalition formation, rationing, core-stability, D79, D74, D63, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, hedonic, games
Coalition formation, problems, rationing rules, ddc:330, hedonic games, core, satbility, Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.), C71, MICROECONOMICS, core stability, MATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS, Cooperative games, coalition formation, rationing, core-stability, D79, D74, D63, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, hedonic, games
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