
doi: 10.3982/ecta6995
The paper extends both the Vickrey-Gloves-Clarke (VGC) and \textit{C. d'Aspremont} and \textit{L.-A. Gerard-Varet}'s [``Incentives and incomplete information'', J. Public Econ. 11, 22--45 (1979)] mechanisms to general dynamic settings under the natural extensions of the private values and independence assumptions considered by these authors. In particular, the paper considers a general infinite-horizon dynamic model in which agents observe private signals over time and decisions are made over time, with the distribution of private signals affected by both past signals and past decisions.
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, folk theorems with private information, Stochastic games, stochastic differential games, dynamic mechanism design, budget balance, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, dynamic incentive compatibility, Markov games with private information, Continuous-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, folk theorems with private information, Stochastic games, stochastic differential games, dynamic mechanism design, budget balance, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, dynamic incentive compatibility, Markov games with private information, Continuous-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces
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