Hindsight bias characterizes much of human action and is equally descriptive of scientific discovery. When Filippo Brunelleschi told the Overseers of the Works of the Florence Cathedral that he had a design for the Cupola of the Cathedral, they were reluctant to give him the commission until they saw the actual plans. (The Cathedral had been without a dome for years because of the difficulty of designing one to bridge without armature the great expanse between the walls.) Brunelleschi dissented, allowing that once seeing the plans, the Overseers would interpret his solution as obvious and thus not worthy of the commission. To illustrate his point, Brunelleschi challenged the Overseers to stand an egg on end. After hearing that one doesn't stand eggs on end, Brunelleshi gradually flattened the end of the egg on the table until it rested solidly on its end. Notwithstanding the predictable reply, "Anyone could have done it that way," Brunelleschi received the commission, and the Cathedral embraces his dome even today, five-and-a-half centuries later. Hary and Massaro (1982) argued for maintaining a distinction between the phenomenon of categorical perception and the occurrence of categorical results in the identification/discrimination task. Although Pastore, Szczesiul, Wielgus, Nowikas, and Logan (1984) claim that this conclusion "has been reached by many researchers who have published over the last decade" (p. (00), we ask why the study of categorical speech and nonspeech perception has been wedded to the identification/discrimination task? If categorical results in this task do not necessarily implicate categorical perception, how can they be diagnostic of the phenomenon or clarify the nature of the phenomenon? We now address each of the three criticisms given by Pastore et al.