One can hardly imagine human rights – aimed to guarantee minimum requirements for a dignified life for all – without human bodies. In legal thinking, however, the corporeal is often remarkably absent, or overshadowed by abstract, disembodied conceptualisations of ‘the’ human being and his (more than her, or their) presupposed autonomy. In this contribution we explore how the body figures in human rights conceptually, legally and empirically. We ask how diverse bodies are differently protected by human rights. Through legal theoretical analysis and two empirical case studies (on respectively transgender and intersex persons’ experiences with gender registration, and sex workers’ social exclusion during the COVID-19 pandemic), we explore what the concepts of autonomy, dignity and equality mean for different (kinds of) bodies. We conclude that autonomy, although heavily criticised in its abstracted understanding, is a paramount human rights value for individuals whose bodies or sexuality are perceived as non-conforming. It can support their self-actualisation and help them fight unjust government interference with their bodies or sex(ed) lives. Negative obligations of states, such as those deriving from the right not to be discriminated against or tortured, and the right to self-determination are crucial to fight embodied inequalities, and ensure that every-body can effectively claim their human rights.