The classic design of the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) protocol relies on a centralized primary node, which not only creates a performance bottleneck but also introduces severe data censorship risks, threatening the data integrity and security of Edge Computing networks. To address this challenge, this paper proposes DC-PBFT (Decoupled PBFT), a censorship-resistant consensus protocol for Edge-Internet of Things (Edge-IoT) environments. The core innovation of DC-PBFT lies in the decoupling of the Proposer and Primary roles, supplemented by Verifiable Random Function (VRF)-based dynamic role rotation, which fundamentally eliminates the arbitrary power of a single node. Building on this, the protocol introduces a parallel group consensus mechanism: an elected Consensus Committee (CC) composed of Active Edge Nodes leads the consensus, while an independent Replica Network (RN) performs parallel validation. When a disagreement arises, the protocol triggers a global disagreement arbitration process involving all nodes to guarantee final consistency and attribute fault. To ensure long-term incentive compatibility, we also designed a hybrid election mechanism combining Proof-of-Stake and dynamic reputation, along with corresponding economic incentives and a tiered penalty system. Theoretical analysis proves that DC-PBFT satisfies Consistency and Liveness, and achieves strong censorship resistance guarantees. Simulation results demonstrate that DC-PBFT’s scalability significantly outperforms PBFT and RepChain; its reputation mechanism effectively improves long-term performance under sustained Byzantine attacks; and, compared to asynchronous censorship-resistant protocols like HoneyBadgerBFT, DC-PBFT achieves censorship resistance with over 45% lower transaction confirmation latency.