In this commentary, I will discuss a particular category of epiphanies, which we might call “epiphanies of existence.” These are experiences in which the existence of something (oneself, a bird, or the whole) is suddenly revealed through a specific pathos. I will focus on the reports of six experiences (by Coleridge, Hadot, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Kant, Murdoch), but I shall mostly concentrate on Wittgenstein’s, Sartre’s and Murdoch’s interpretations of their own respective experiences. I will begin my discussion by highlighting common features between their accounts, suggesting on this ground that they are all undergoing the same type of experience. Then I shall argue that Sartre’s epiphany of existence, as described in his novel Nausea, is not, contrary to what Chappell thinks, a dysepiphany. Finally, I shall argue that Murdochs’ epiphany of the kestrel, one of Chappell’s favorite examples of epiphany, is indeed an epiphany of existence akin to the one described by Sartre in Nausea. On this ground, I shall argue that Chappell’s reading of Murdoch’s epiphany might be wrong.