The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. ; Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on July 28, 2009) ; Thesis (Ph. D.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2008. ; This work is a defense of philosophical intuitions and the use of them in philosophy. First, I survey the main forms of intuition-based philosophical methods - conceptual analysis, explication, and reflective equilibrium - and demonstrate how each treats philosophical intuitions as basic evidential sources. Next, I will develop and argue for a conception of what a philosophical intuition is. Third, I will provide an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of a philosophical intuition. Finally, I will argue that if philosophy wishes to use intuitions in philosophical theorizing, then it must engage in practical explication. To this end, I will be developing an account of philosophical intuitions that correctly captures the nature of the intuitions used in philosophy and demonstrating how philosophers best can use those intuitions to justify their analyses of philosophical concepts. ; Includes bibliographical references.