This paper examines the evolution of Russian geopolitical imaginaries through a critical comparison between classical Eurasianism and the contemporary concept of “Greater Eurasia” [Бoльшaя Еврaзия]. While both paradigms share a common lexicon and spatial referent, they diverge fundamentally in their underlying assumptions and strategic orientations. Classical Eurasianism – developed in the 1920s and revived in neo-Eurasianist discourse after 1991 – posits Russia as an autonomous continental civilization rooted in internal coherence, self-sufficiency, and geopolitical isolation. In contrast, the Greater Eurasia project, emerging prominently in the 2010s and accelerated by Russia’s war against Ukraine, rejects autarky in favor of deep transnational integration, particularly with Asia. This new vision emphasizes Russia’s structural weakness and dependency, especially in relation to China, and reframes Eurasia not as a unique civilizational space but as a transcontinental zone of cooperation. The paper explores these transformations across three dimensions: the geographical scope of “Eurasia,” Russia’s relationship to external powers, and the shifting dynamics of its strategic partnership with China. Ultimately, it argues that Greater Eurasia constitutes a break from the Eurasianist paradigm, reflecting a pragmatic and unprecedented acknowledgement of Russia’s subordinate status in a Sino-centric order, and marking a profound shift in the country’s geopolitical self-conception.