Fair value evaluation is adopted over K-IFRS adoption. Especially, fair value evaluation model can be used on property, plant and equipment. Companies tried to improve financial condition like lowering debt ratio using asset revaluation when asset revaluation was allowed by Asset Revaluation Law during 1958～2000. However, Asset Revaluation Law was abolished after 2000. Asset revaluation was permitted again when K-IFRS was adopted. This study is an empirical study that analyzes the meaning of asset revaluation to auditor and information users. Many previous studies about asset revaluation suggest that asset revaluation is used as a way to improve financial condition(Song et al., 2011; Chung and Kim, 2015). However, Kim and Woo(2016) insist that asset revaluation relieves information asymmetry. If an executive uses asset revaluation as a way to improve financial condition, auditor would regard asset revaluation as a factor which increases audit risk. Because improvement of financial condition by asset revaluation doesn’t come from business improvement but from revaluation surplus, it is likely for auditor to regard asset revaluation as an executive’s discretionary action and to estimate audit risk high. Thus, audit report lag is likely to become longer. However, if auditor considers that asset revaluation can relieve information asymmetry, auditor would not consider asset revaluation as a factor which increases audit risk and try to provide accounting information to users earlier. Therefore, audit report lag might decrease. According to previous studies, investors consider asset revaluation positively(Kim et al., 2011; Yoo et al., 2012; Yang and Shin, 2013). Because executive prefers disclosing financial statements which include asset revaluation earlier, management discretionary report lag might decrease. The empirical results are as follows. First, we find that asset revaluation decreases audit report lag. This result suggests that auditor considers that asset revaluation relieve information asymmetry and have an incentive to decrease audit report lag. Second, there is no significant association between asset revaluation and management discretionary report lag. This result means that because auditor reduces audit report lag sufficiently even though asset revaluation relieve information asymmetry, there is no incentive for executive to reduce management discretionary report lag additionally. The contribution of this study is to provide an empirical evidence about whether auditor regards asset revaluation as a factor of which increases audit risk by examining auditor’s response on asset revaluation. This study also provides additional evidence about the meaning of asset revaluation by analyzing empirically on how executive behaves after external audit procedure in case of asset revaluation.