Jiirgen Habermas has described his conception of discourse ethics as a moral theory that can aid the understanding of social, legal, and political developments. This paper will examine contrasting visions of the status of discourse ethics concerning its relation to morality, law, and politics. I shall begin with a brief sketch of Habermas's understanding of the relationship between morality, law, and politics followed by a close examination of Habermas's philosophical justification for discourse ethics as set out in his essay entitled "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification," and elaborated upon in Erliuterungen zur Diskursethik.1 The second section of my paper will engage three critiques leveled by sympathetic critics which converge upon Habermas's crucial distinction between the good and the just. Jean Cohen critiques Habermas for blurring this distinction, questioning the appropriateness of discourse ethics as a moral theory, rather than simply a theory of sociopolitical norm legitimation. Seyla Benhabib and Agnes Heller both