"Justice in the 20th Century" has as many meanings as there are moral and social philosophies,' and academic opinion ranges over the entire spectrum. Some sophisticates think "justice" is only the symbol of an irrational hope whose function is to arouse the emotions of creatures addicted to self-deception, while at the opposite extreme are the contemporary adherents of classical natural law realism. In view of the general abandonment and criticism in contemporary moral philosophy of emotive positivism, its invalidity will be assumed in this discussion; accordingly, it will also be assumed that "justice" is a meaningful term. But instead of the currently popular linguistic analysis of the uses of that term, the present approach will be focused on specific problems; and while it is believed that 20th century justice is unique in some ways, any analysis of justice must deal with such traditional ideas as equality, desert and responsibility. At the same time, if that is done realistically, it must be "relevant," as the saying goes, to 20th century conditions and problems. Because they are frequently variations of one of Kant's versions of the categorical imperative, most philosophical discussions of justice are carried on at a very high level of abstraction; they culminate in very broad generalizations remote from the practical problems of 20th century justice. Accordingly, an effort will be made to present a more pointed analysis. If high-level abstraction is the Scylla of any venture on the tortuous path to the elucidation of "justice in the 20th century," its Charybdis is the easy reward of applause for an oration on human rights.