I N SEPTEMBER 1975 the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Razak, described the recent resurgence of communist guerrilla activity in peninsular Malaysia as the "New Emergency,"' an appellation harking back to the twelve-year guerrilla war from I 948 to I 960 commonly referred to as the "Emergency." By making the comparison, the Prime Minister clearly signalled the seriousness with which the Malaysian Government viewed the renewal of the communist threat. Indeed, few would deny the gravity of the situation created by the recrudescence of guerrilla activity. Not only had there been a number of spectacular terrorist attacks-the bombing of the capital's War Memorial; the assassination of Perak's Chief of Police; and the grenade and rocket attacks on the Police Field Force Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur military air base and several camps in Johore, Port Dickson and Penang-but also, and perhaps more ominiously, there had been a steady increase over the preceding three years in the number of police and security force personnel killed and injured. Moreover, the communists seem to have been able to attract recruits and solicit at least some support throughout the peninsula. What has prompted and sustained this communist resurgence? What will be the outcome of this "New Emergency"? This article does not provide definitive answers but rather explores some important facets of a highly complex situation-specifically four factors which directly affected the development of the "New Emergency:" the division amongst the communists, the state of the Malaysian economy, the Malaysian Government's policies, and the influence of regional events.