Philosophical work on the emotions can take a variety of forms, among which the following three are perhaps most common. There are, first, studies that attempt to analyse the nature of emotions in general, identifying the features that distinguish them from psychological states of other kinds, and their connections with such phenomena as rationality, perception, experience, memory, action, and the like.' Second, there are works that focus on particular emotions or classes of emotion, such as guilt, pride, love, and friendship;2 these works attempt to identify the features that set the selected emotions apart from other emotional states, tracing their links with cognition and affect and their characteristic expression in action. There are, finally, studies of the significance of the emotions for the philosophical understanding of morality.3 These typically address questions concerning the importance of emotions for character, action, and moral education, and explore the implications of such questions for traditional conceptions of practical reason and moral principle. Valuing Emotions by Michael Stocker is an ambitious work that addresses questions of all three kinds. Actually, the title page of the book informs us that it is by Stocker "with Elizabeth Hegeman," a psychoanalyst and anthropologist, who evidently collaborated with Stocker on chaps. 3, 7,